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Spurred by the seemingly ever-growing list of corporate scandals at the time, the United States passed the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, which requires managers to evaluate the design and eﬀectiveness of their
internal control systems and report their overall conclusions, at which point they must employ an external
auditor to audit their internal control systems and attest to the accuracy of the company management asser-
tion that internal accounting controls are in place, operational and eﬀective (SOX 302, 404). In China, inves-
tors and policymakers have also paid increasing attention to ﬁrms’ internal controls. Since 2006, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges have released
a series of internal control-related regulations. In 2008, the Ministry of Finance released the Enterprise Inter-
nal Control Basic Standard, which is considered the Chinese SOX (C-SOX) and is aimed at standardizing the
construction of internal controls in Chinese ﬁrms and strengthening the supervision and assessment of internal
controls. Regarding internal control audits, unlike in the United States, there were no mandatory require-
ments for most Chinese listed ﬁrms before 2010. Since 2007, the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
have explicitly encouraged listed ﬁrms to report their internal control self-assessments and voluntarily hire
CPA ﬁrms to conduct audits of internal controls. Hiring auditors to provide extra audit reports on internal
controls produces additional costs. However, according to our statistics, from 2007 to 2009, there were
133, 161 and 210 listed ﬁrms that voluntarily disclosed their auditors’ reports on internal controls (ARICs).
What were the motives and incentives for those ﬁrms to voluntarily audit their internal control systems? What
factors caused such diﬀerential disclosure decisions? These are still open questions. Lin and Rao (2009) show
that ﬁrms with high internal control quality and those that want to reﬁnance are more likely to audit their
internal controls to send a positive signal to the market. This study investigates the motives behind the vol-
untary auditing of internal controls from a corporate governance perspective. In particular, we discuss the
relationships among board independence, voluntary audit and disclosure decisions under diﬀerent internal
information environments.
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) note, the separation of property and management rights creates agency
problems between principals and agents. The latter tend to hide information in the hope of maintaining their
private control beneﬁts (Chen and Jaggi, 2000; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004). As a mechanism
for solving agency problems, eﬀective corporate governance is capable of increasing both the quantity and
quality of disclosures in addition to enhancing voluntary disclosure. Fama (1980) believes that the board of
directors is the core of an internal governance mechanism that monitors agents. Among all of the board char-
acteristics, the proportion of independent directors is one of the most important factors because it reﬂects
board independence and is considered an objective and professional monitoring mechanism. Cheng et al.
(2009) show that the independent director system provides a more secure control mechanism for managing
employment contracts, such that the independent directors’ professional knowledge makes board decisions
more scientiﬁc and capable of eﬀectively preventing ﬁnancial report distortion. We predict that a higher pro-
portion of eﬀective independent directors on a board will drive the ﬁrm to voluntarily audit its internal control
system and disclose the related audit report.
Independent directors aﬀect auditing and disclosure decisions regarding internal controls in the following
ways. First, consistent with the literature, the monitoring role of independent directors will push the ﬁrm to
disclose more information, including internal control information, to investors, which increases the likelihood
that the internal control system will be audited to reduce information asymmetry and agency problems (direct
eﬀect). Second, under the requirements of C-SOX, the board of directors has the primary responsibility for
establishing internal controls. The audit committee, under the control of the board, plays a core role in the
detailed design and daily review of the internal control system. If the board is more independent, its monitor-
ing function will be more pronounced, to the extent that the ﬁrm will pay more attention to the establishment
of its internal control system. These ﬁrms are also more likely to send a signal of the eﬀectiveness of their inter-
nal controls by disclosing their third-party veriﬁcation reports (indirect eﬀect).
We choose the voluntary disclosure of ARIC to test the monitoring eﬀectiveness of independent directors for
the following reasons. First, given the increased attention that internal control systems have been receiving in
China and around the world, internal control information has become more important to investors’ decision
making. An internal control system plays an important role in ensuring the eﬃciency of daily operations
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ﬁnancial reports but also showcases the ﬁrm’s ability to avoid risk and fraud. Investors can then use it to eval-
uate the ﬁrm’s future value. Second, previous studies attempt to verify the monitoring role of independent direc-
tors by investigating whether it improves the ﬁrm’s earnings quality and value, but the results have been mixed.
For example, from an earnings quality perspective, Park and Shin (2004) and Peasnell et al. (2005) show that an
independent board can improve a ﬁrm’s earnings quality, whereas Klein (2002) does not ﬁnd such a relation-
ship. Results are also not consistent on the relationship between board independence and ﬁrm performance or
value.1 Some studies show that there is a positive relationship (Rhoades et al., 2000; Rosenstein and Wyatt,
1990) while others ﬁnd that the composition of the board does not inﬂuence ﬁrm value (Yermack, 1996; Dalton
et al., 1998; Hsu, 2010). We believe that internal control quality is diﬀerent from earnings quality and ﬁrm per-
formance, although the former can inﬂuence the latter. The latter also varies between ﬁrms as the result of ﬁxed
business models and economic environments, such that strengthening constraints and supervision mechanisms
may not have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence. However, the quality of a ﬁrm’s internal controls is a direct consequence of
its monitoring mechanisms, and our investigation of the relationship between board independence and volun-
tary ARIC disclosure provides more direct evidence of the monitoring role of independent directors. Third, this
voluntarily disclosed information is evaluated by third-party auditors who face litigation risks when providing
their audit reports. Thus, compared to other voluntarily disclosed information, such as earnings forecasts and
CSR reports, this information is more reliable and objective.
We also highlight how the information asymmetry between insiders and independent directors aﬀects the
monitoring eﬀectiveness of the latter. As per the deﬁnition of an independent director in the code of corporate
governance, an independent director should not have any pecuniary relations or transactions with the com-
pany or its promoters; his decisions should be independent of those who have a controlling stake in the com-
pany and be in the overall interests of the company and its stakeholders. However, board independence is a
double-edged sword in that it reduces the likelihood of collusion between the board and management, but also
weakens the board’s ability to obtain useful private information (Bushman et al., 2004). Given this, whether
independent directors can adopt monitoring and advising roles depends on whether they can gather enough
information. Jensen (1993) notes that management makes the decisions regarding when and how much infor-
mation is disclosed to the board. If a signiﬁcant amount of information is hidden, even talented directors are
unable to review and evaluate management’s decisions and the ﬁrm’s strategies. When information asymmetry
exists between management and the board and information acquisition costs are relatively high, corporate
governance mechanisms such as independent directors and audit committees are hindered. The right to make
decisions is also in the hands of management or controlling shareholders, such that the rights of minority
shareholders are not protected. Only when internal information asymmetry is low and independent directors
have enough information to help them make good decisions can they take appropriate actions to reduce
agency problems and improve disclosure quality and the voluntary disclosure level.
However, internal information asymmetry levels are hard to measure. We use traditional measures that
reﬂect the quality of the external information environment with expert information medium characteristics
(including analysts and institutional investors) as proxy variables. If the external information environment
is better, independent directors can obtain information through lower information acquisition costs, which
helps them make better decisions based on the quality and quantity of the existing information disclosed
by managers. Then, when making decisions or voting they can question managers. In addition, when the exter-
nal information environment is better the ﬁrm will attract more attention from the public. In cases where a
ﬁrm’s risky behavior or fraud is confronted, independent directors take on increased reputation costs and
are thus more likely to ask managers to provide more private information. Thus, the external information
environment indirectly helps reduce information asymmetry between insiders and independent directors.
Our main ﬁnding supports our expectation that when information asymmetry between insiders and outside
directors is low, there is a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors on the board
and the likelihood of a ﬁrm voluntarily disclosing its ARIC.1 These studies often use measures such as ﬁrm ﬁnancial ratios (e.g. ROA, EPS), Tobin’s Q and the market reaction to proxy for ﬁrm
performance and value.
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discuss how board independence inﬂuences voluntary disclosure around the world. For example, Shen et al.
(2010) ﬁnd that in China the proportion of independent directors has a positive eﬀect on the voluntary disclo-
sure of corporate social responsibility. Zhang and Huang (2010) note that board independence drives ﬁrms to
voluntarily conduct interim audits. Fang et al. (2009) show that there is a positive relationship between the
proportion of independent directors and voluntary internal control information disclosure. Our study diﬀers
from these by showing how internal information asymmetry inﬂuences the monitoring role of independent
directors in driving managers to improve voluntary disclosure levels. Our results partially explain the mixed
results in the literature on the function of independent directors. Second, regarding internal controls, unlike
US ﬁrms subject to SOX 404, which mandatorily requires that they audit their internal control systems, Chi-
nese ﬁrms were able to choose whether to audit their internal controls during our sample period. This provides
us with a unique setting and our ﬁndings will enrich the internal control literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops
our hypothesis. Section 3 introduces the sample and speciﬁes our research design. Section 4 provides descrip-
tive statistics and presents the results of our univariate and multivariate tests. Section 5 discusses several
robustness tests and provides additional analysis. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Literature review and research hypothesis
Previous studies test whether board independence, as one of the monitoring mechanisms of corporate gov-
ernance, increases disclosure quality, but the results are mixed. Using a sample of Hong Kong listed ﬁrms,
Chen and Jaggi (2000) ﬁnd a positive relationship between the proportion of independent directors and com-
prehensive ﬁnancial disclosures. This positive eﬀect is more pronounced in non-family controlled ﬁrms than
family controlled ﬁrms. Using a sample of 385 Hong Kong listed ﬁrms, Gul and Leung (2004) show that
the duality of a board’s CEO and Chairman negatively inﬂuences disclosure levels and that the proportion
of experienced independent directors weakens this negative eﬀect. Eng and Mak (2003) investigate Singapore
listed ﬁrms to test the relationship between the proportion of independent directors and voluntary disclosure,
speciﬁcally the comprehensive disclosure rating for non-mandatory strategies and non-ﬁnancial and ﬁnancial
information. In contrast to Chen and Jaggi’s (2000) ﬁndings, Eng and Mak (2003) show that a higher propor-
tion of independent directors is associated with lower voluntary disclosure levels.
However, these studies pay little attention to how independent directors should eﬀectively fulﬁll their duties.
Private control beneﬁts and the psychological value of being in control make agents less willing to disclose infor-
mation to outsiders or even other board members, such as independent directors (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). A
decision regarding whether a board is eﬀective must consider more than whether it is independent because inter-
nal information asymmetry impedes outside directors from performing their monitoring and advising roles.
Regarding the diﬀerentiation in the attainment of ﬁrm information, studies suggest that managers and inside
directors grasp the most while independent directors attain less and outside investors are provided with the least
(Armstrong et al., 2010). If the information asymmetry between independent directors and insiders is high, the
former can hardly monitor and advise the agents. The literature (e.g., Raheja, 2005; Adams and Ferreira, 2007;
Harris and Raviv, 2008; Duchin et al., 2010) suggests that it is important to consider the information environ-
ment that surrounds a board when evaluating the role of independent directors. Raheja (2005) claims that
optimal board structure is determined by the trade-oﬀ between maximizing the incentives for insiders to reveal
their private information, minimizing coordination costs among outsiders and maximizing outsiders’ ability to
reject inferior projects. Adams and Ferreira (2007) analyze the dual roles of boards as monitors and advisors.
They ﬁnd that directors’ monitoring costs signiﬁcantly increase if the CEO is reluctant to share internal infor-
mation, which suggests that management-friendly boards can be optimal. Harris and Raviv (2008) also use an
analytical model to conclude that given the information asymmetry between directors andmanagers, sharehold-
ers are sometimes better oﬀ with an insider-controlled board.
Independent directors can thus only play their role and help reduce agency problems when internal infor-
mation asymmetry is low. Therefore, our analysis investigates how the proportion of independent directors
inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s voluntary disclosure decisions under varied internal information asymmetry. Speciﬁcally,
we believe that when a ﬁrm’s inside information asymmetry is high, independent directors do not have enough
Table 1
Distribution of voluntary disclosure sample
Panel A: Sample distribution by year
Year DISCi,t Proportion of disclosure sample %
0 1
2007 856 133 13.45
2008 833 161 16.20
2009 746 210 21.97
Total 2,435 504 17.15
Panel B: Sample distributed by industry
Industry DISCi,t Proportion of disclosure sample %
0 1
Comprehensive 132 18 12.00
Media 19 7 26.92
Social service 57 15 20.83
Real estate 192 43 18.30
Wholesale and retail 181 41 18.47
IT 151 25 14.20
Transportation and warehousing 88 35 28.46
Construction 49 10 16.95
Production and supply of electricity, gas and water 132 27 16.98
Manufacturing 1,329 253 15.99
Mining 51 12 19.05
Agriculture forestry, stockraising and ﬁshing 54 18 25.00
Total 2,435 504 17.15
Panel C: Sample distribution by disclosure frequency from 2007 to 2009
Disclosure frequency (2007-2009) No. of observations Percentage (%) Cumulative Percentage (%)
0 2,195 74.69 74.69
1 330 11.23 85.91
2 249 8.47 94.39
3 165 5.61 100.00
Total 2,939 100.00 —
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dent directors merely increases “free-riding” behavior rather than eﬀectively inhibiting agency problems. Only
when information asymmetry is low do independent directors have the necessary information to make judg-
ments, and in such conditions, increasing their proportion eﬀectively enhances their right to speak, which
strengthens their monitoring and advising roles.
We predict that under lower internal information asymmetry, eﬀective independent directors will inﬂuence
ﬁrms’ internal control audit decisions based on the following reasons. First, following the literature on the
relationship between agency problems and voluntary disclosure, the conﬂicting interests of management
and shareholders (or controlling and minority shareholders) will prompt management or controlling share-
holders to hide relevant information in an attempt to maximize their personal interests (Luo and Zhu,
2010). In such a case, ﬁrms with serious agency problems will reduce their information disclosure, including
the disclosure of internal control information, and will be less likely to hire third-party auditors. In contrast, a
high-quality board with a high proportion of eﬀective independent directors will help reduce agency problems
and increase the likelihood that an external auditor will be hired to audit a ﬁrm’s internal control system and
disclose the resultant report to the public. This is the direct eﬀect of the independent directors’ monitoring
mechanism on internal control audit decisions.
Second, independent directors inﬂuence ﬁrms’ disclosure decisions regarding internal control audits indi-
rectly by improving the quality of their internal control systems. Under C-SOX, it is the board’s responsibility
to establish a sound internal control system and ensure its eﬀectiveness.2 In particular, an audit committee2 See C-SOX 12 and 13.
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sible for internal control review, monitoring and self-assessment. Independent directors can choose to be
directly involved in the control system inspection process and review the detailed control procedures with
ﬁnancial and accounting staﬀ. Furthermore, in the annual audit of ﬁnancial statements, external auditors ﬁrst
conduct regular and/or special tests on the internal control system and if they are worried about its quality, an
eﬀective board would follow up on the auditors’ concerns to ensure that management makes the required
improvements. Thus, we expect that internal control quality will be positively related to board independence.
Lin and Rao (2009) note that ﬁrms with high-quality internal control systems are more likely to have volun-
tarily audits because doing so sends a strong signal to the market, which increases the ﬁrm’s value as perceived
by investors. Thus, ﬁrms with a high proportion of eﬀective independent directors are more likely to disclose
ARIC.
Based on the abovementioned discussion, we propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. When a ﬁrm’s inside information asymmetry is low, there is a positive relationship between the
proportion of independent directors on the board and the likelihood that a ﬁrm will voluntarily disclose its
auditor’s report on internal controls.3. Research design
3.1. Sample selection
Our sample selection criteria are as follows. The initial sample comprises all non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms listed on the
main boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We exclude ﬁrms listed on the SME boards
(small and medium ﬁrms) and those listed on the growth enterprise market (GEM) boards because the Shenz-
hen Stock Exchange has required ﬁrms listed on the SME and GEM boards to obtain a CPA ﬁrm’s audit
report on the eﬀectiveness of their internal controls over ﬁnancial reporting at least once every 2 years since
2010. Although our sample period does not include 2010, it still reveals that the supervisory intensity of these
two boards regarding internal controls diﬀer from that of the main board. We exclude ﬁnancial industry ﬁrms
because they have stricter disclosure and audit requirements regarding internal controls. In addition, the
CSRC has special regulations on the internal control audits of IPO and SEO ﬁrms, so we exclude these ﬁrms.
We also exclude ﬁrms that have issued both A shares and H or B shares because they are under more stringent
supervision. Finally, we exclude ﬁrms with missing ﬁnancial data. As Table 1 outlines, we obtain a total of
2939 ﬁrm-year observations over the period from 2007 to 2009 after applying the abovementioned selection
criteria.
Our sample period starts in 2007 because that is the year the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges
released explicit provisions for disclosure requirements regarding the self-assessment of internal controls
and encouraged ﬁrms to hire third-party auditors. In addition, Chinese ﬁrms began to follow the new corpo-
rate accounting standards in 2007, so ﬁnancial data is more consistent after this year. We manually collect
data from annual reports or special announcements about ARIC and ultimately indentify 504 ﬁrm-year obser-
vations (17.15% of the sample size) that disclose ARIC along with 2435 that did not. Additional ﬁnancial and
corporate governance data are from the CSMAR database.
Table 1 presents the distribution of voluntary disclosure observations by year and industry along with sta-
tistics on the number of times ﬁrms disclosed ARIC during the 2007–2009 period. Panel A reveals an annual
increase in voluntary disclosures, from 13.45% of the sample in 2007 to 21.97% in 2009. Panel B shows that the
proportion of ﬁrms making ARIC disclosures across various industries ranges from 12.00% to 27.46%, which
is relatively uniform. Panel C indicates that 14.08% of the ﬁrms disclosed ARIC more than twice, which
reﬂects a gradual acceptance of the eﬀectiveness of ARIC.
3.2. Empirical model and variable deﬁnitions
To examine the eﬀect of board independence on ﬁrms’ voluntary disclosure of ARIC decisions under varied
inside information asymmetry, we estimate the following regression model:
Table 2
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable name Deﬁnition
DISCi,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm voluntarily discloses auditor’s report on internal controls in the current year, and
0 otherwise
INDEPi,t Proportion of independent directors on the board
INFORIi,t Any one of the following information environment proxy variables, including ANADUM, ANA, ANA_AD, FORSD,
FORERR, INSHD, and ACINSHD
ANADUMi,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm has at least one analyst who issues forecasts, and 0 otherwise
ANAi,t Natural logarithm of the number of analysts
ANA_ADi,t Size-adjusted number of analysts, measured as the residual from a regression of the number of analysts on ﬁrm size
FORSDi,t Standard deviation of analyst forecasts, measured as the inter-analyst standard deviation of forecasts deﬂated by stock
price
FORERRi,t Analyst forecast error, measured as the absolute diﬀerence between the actual earnings per share and the median analyst
forecast of earning per share, deﬂated by price per share
INSHDi,t Institutional ownership, measured as percentage ownership in year t by all institutional investors
ACINSHDi,t Active institutional ownership, measured as percentage ownership in year t by hedge funds and investment advisors
SIZEi,t Natural logarithm of total assets
AGEi,t Natural logarithm of the number of years since the IPO
ROEi,t Return on book equity, measured as net income divided by book equity
GROWTHi,t Sales growth, measured as the percentage change of sales over year t  1 to year t
SOEi,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is ultimately controlled by the central and local governments at the provincial,
municipal and county level or other governmental institutions, and 0 otherwise
BIGi,t Dummy variable equal to 1 if ﬁrm i hires a Big 4 auditor in year t, and 0 otherwise
MEETINGi,t Due diligence by the board of directors, measured as the number of board meetings
BOARDi,t Total number of directors on the board
FBi,t Directors with accounting or ﬁnance backgrounds, measured as the number of directors with accounting or ﬁnance
backgrounds deﬂated by the total number of directors on the board
MBi,t Market-to-book ratio, measured as the market value of owners’ equity and the book value of total liabilities all divided
by the book value of total assets
LagINDEPi,t Proportion of independent members on the board in the three years before year t
3 Sim
enviro
also ru
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probðDISCi;tÞ
1 probðDISCi;tÞ
 
¼ b0 þ b1INDEP i;t þ b2INDEP i;t  INFORIi;t þ b3SIZEi;t þ b4AGEi;t
þ b5ROEi;t þ b6GROWTHi;t þ b7SOEi;t þ b8BIGi;t þ b9MEETINGi;t
þ b10BOARDi;t þ b11FBi;t þ
X
INDi;t þ
X
YEARi;t þ ei;t ð1Þwhere DISCi,t is a dummy variable equal to 1 when ﬁrm i voluntarily discloses ARIC in year t. Our main test
variable is the interaction between the proportion of independent directors INDEPi,t and the information
asymmetry proxy INFORIi,t.
3 Following previous studies (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Krishnaswami and
Subramaniam, 1999; Duchin et al., 2010), we choose an analyst following dummy variable, number of ana-
lysts, size-adjusted number of analysts, standard deviation of analyst forecasts, analyst forecast error, institu-
tional ownership and active institutional ownership (including hedge funds and investment advisors) as the
proxy variables. Detailed variable deﬁnitions are presented in Table 2. The rationale behind using external
information environment variables to proxy for information asymmetry between insiders and outside direc-
tors is as follows. Independent directors can obtain information from two sources: outside public information
and internal information privately disclosed by managers. For a given amount of inside information, when the
external information environment is better, independent directors enjoy a wider range of information sources
and can enjoy lower information acquisition costs, which veriﬁes the reliability and relevance of the internal
information and reduces the information asymmetry between independent directors and managers. In addi-
tion, by relaxing the assumption that the amount of inside information is constant and given the improvementilar to Duchin et al. (2010), we do not put an information asymmetry proxy in the model. When we put an information
nment index in the regression, the model has serious multicollinearity problems when submitted to VIF testing. For robustness, we
n subsample regressions based on information asymmetry high/low groups.
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because the improvement of the external information environment makes ﬁrms more vulnerable to public
concerns, such that their violations and poor decisions are more likely to be discovered. Accordingly, indepen-
dent directors must then shoulder more responsibility and endure higher reputation costs. Therefore, indepen-
dent directors will either ask for more private information, as the private information obtained by independent
directors net of information disclosed to public is reduced, or they will choose to leave the ﬁrm. Ultimately, the
improvement of the external environment will reduce the internal information asymmetry between insiders
and independent directors.
As control variables, we use other ﬁrm-level variables that are deemed to inﬂuence voluntary ARIC disclo-
sure decisions. These include ﬁrm size (SIZE), the number of years since IPO (AGE), ﬁrm performance (ROE),
sales growth (GROWTH), auditor size (BIG) and whether or not the ﬁrm is a SOE (SOE). We also control for
other board characteristics, including board size (Board), board meetings (MEETING) and board ﬁnancial
background (FB). All variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics and univariate tests
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables. The small standard deviations of all of the
variables relative to their means show that there is not wide variation among sample observations. The mean
(median) of the proportion of independent directors in the sample is 36% (33%) and the minimum and max-
imum are 25% and 56%. Table 4 reports the results of both parametric and non-parametric tests for the mean
and median diﬀerences among all of the main variables, respectively, between the two groups that do or do not
disclose ARIC. The univariate tests show that the mean and median of the proportion of independent
directors in the voluntary disclosure group are not signiﬁcantly greater than those in the other group, which
indicates that a failure to consider internal information asymmetry creates a situation in which the monitoring
eﬀectiveness of independent directors is unclear. Regarding the other control variables, larger ﬁrms with
higher ROE are more likely to disclose ARIC, which is consistent with signaling incentives. That is, bigger
and better ﬁrms grasp more beneﬁts in avoiding adverse selection when they send good news to the market.
Firms with shorter listing periods are also more likely to disclose ARIC because young ﬁrms have more infor-Table 3
Descriptive statistics.
Variables Obs. Mean SD 1% percentile 25% percentile 50% percentile 75% percentile 99% percentile
INDEPi,t 2939 0.36 0.05 0.25 0.33 0.33 0.38 0.56
SIZEi,t 2939 7.72 1.13 4.92 6.98 7.68 8.42 10.83
AGEi,t 2939 2.22 0.43 1.10 1.95 2.30 2.48 2.83
ROEi,t 2939 0.05 0.28 1.55 0.02 0.06 0.12 1.05
GROWTHi,t 2939 0.64 2.64 0.94 0.10 0.09 0.39 21.59
SOEi,t 2939 0.65 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
BIGi,t 2939 0.04 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
MEETINGi,t 2939 9.31 3.57 4.00 7.00 9.00 11.00 21.00
BOARDi,t 2939 9.18 1.90 5.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 15.00
FBi,t 2939 0.23 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.33 0.57
ANADUMi,t 2939 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
ANAi,t 2114 2.01 0.99 0.69 1.10 1.95 2.83 4.04
ANA_ADi,t 2114 10.68 10.80 31.13 18.02 11.78 5.98 22.04
FORSDi,t 1710 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.19
FORERRi,t 2082 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.40
INSHDi,t 2939 10.50 16.62 0.00 0.00 2.28 14.40 70.02
ACINSHDi,t 2939 9.88 16.06 0.00 0.00 1.83 13.24 69.08
LagINDEPi 2905 0.35 0.05 0.20 0.33 0.33 0.36 0.50
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
Table 4
Univariate tests.
Variables Mean values t-Value Median values Wilcoxon z-value
VA = 0 (n = 2435) VA = 1 (n = 504) VA = 0 (n = 2435) VA = 1 (n = 504)
INDEPi,t 0.36 0.36 0.82 0.33 0.33 0.83
SIZEi,t 7.62 8.20 10.75*** 7.58 8.06 10.28***
AGEi,t 2.24 2.11 6.56
*** 2.30 2.20 5.99***
ROEi,t 0.04 0.09 3.38*** 0.06 0.09 6.21***
GROWTHi,t 0.69 0.40 2.26
** 0.09 0.09 0.74
SOEi,t 0.63 0.77 6.28*** 1.00 1.00 6.24***
BIGi,t 0.04 0.04 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.23
MEETINGi,t 9.22 9.73 2.94*** 9.00 9.00 1.56
BOARDi,t 9.14 9.42 3.08*** 9.00 9.00 2.14**
FBi,t 0.23 0.22 2.55
** 0.22 0.22 2.45**
ANADUMi,t 0.68 0.91 10.48*** 1.00 1.00 10.29***
ANAi,t 1.92 2.36 8.59*** 1.79 2.48 8.20***
ANA_ADi,t 11.26 8.57 4.75*** 12.07 9.86 4.02***
FORSDi,t 0.02 0.03 0.68 0.01 0.01 1.01
FORERRi,t 0.03 0.02 2.38
** 0.01 0.01 1.29
INSHDi,t 9.46 15.54 7.55*** 1.52 8.12 10.58***
ACINSHDi,t 8.87 14.77 7.59*** 1.17 7.52 10.93***
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level, respectively.
Y. Sun et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 145–161 153mation asymmetry with outsiders, which increases their motive to disclose more information to reduce ﬁnanc-
ing costs. In contrast, older ﬁrms tend to have stable relationships with creditors and shareholders, which
makes them less likely to voluntarily disclose information. Regarding the nature of property rights, SOEs
are more likely to disclose ARIC compared to non-SOEs because regulators such as the CSRC encourage
SOEs, particularly central SOEs, to take the lead in following internal control-related regulations. The above-
mentioned results are consistent with the ﬁndings of previous studies, such as those of Lin and Rao (2009).
Regarding board characteristics, our results show that when board size is larger, the corporate governance
level is higher and the ﬁrm is more likely to disclose ARIC. However, the t-test shows that the companies with
more directors that have ﬁnancial backgrounds are less likely to disclose ARIC, which is not consistent with
our expectation. We also ﬁnd that most of the proxy variables for information environment show that when
ﬁrms have better information environments, they are more likely to disclose ARIC.4.2. Regression results
Table 5 presents the results of our main regression of Eq. (1). All of our reported p-values for the estimated
coeﬃcients are on an adjusted basis using standard errors correlated for clustering at the ﬁrm level to alleviate
concerns about residual serial correlation and adjusted for heteroskedasticity. Column 1 of Table 5 presents
the model that does not consider information asymmetry, which reveals that the coeﬃcient of INDEP is not
signiﬁcant. Columns 2–8 present analyst following, number of analysts, size-adjusted number of analysts,
standard deviation of analyst forecasts, analyst forecast error, institutional ownership and active institutional
ownership, respectively, as proxy variables for inside information asymmetry to examine the relationship
between the proportion of independent directors and voluntary disclosure decisions under varied information
asymmetry between insiders and independent directors. Our results show that all of the signs of the interac-
tions between the information asymmetry proxy variables and INDEP are consistent with our expectations
and, except for FORSDINDEP, all of them are signiﬁcant. Speciﬁcally, when a ﬁrm has at least one analyst
who posts forecasts (ANADUM = 1), or when the number of analysts (or size-adjusted number of analysts) is
larger, or when the standard deviation of analyst forecasts is smaller, or when analyst forecast error is smaller,
or when institutional ownership (or active institutional ownership) is higher, then a higher proportion of inde-
pendent directors creates a higher likelihood that the ﬁrm will disclose ARIC, such that the interactions of
Table 5
The relationship between board independence, internal information environment and the voluntary disclosure of auditor’s reports on internal controls.
Independent variables VA (Full sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
INDEPi,t 1.254
(0.86)
1.000
(0.67)
0.531
(0.33)
2.577*
(1.66)
1.402
(0.89)
1.396
(0.93)
1.073
(0.75)
1.075
(0.75)
ANADUMi,t  INDEPi,t 2.448***
(4.19)
ANAi,t  INDEPi,t 0.988***
(3.77)
ANA_ADi,t  INDEPi,t 0.081***
(4.24)
FORSDi,t  INDEPi,t 7.749
(1.36)
FORERRi,t  INDEPi,t 6.336**
(1.96)
INSHDi,t  INDEPi,t 0.027**
(2.42)
ACINSHDi,t  INDEPi,t 0.028**
(2.49)
SIZEi,t 0.424
***
(5.81)
0.321***
(4.13)
0.136
(1.42)
0.300***
(3.75)
0.299***
(3.39)
0.323***
(3.95)
0.364***
(4.61)
0.363***
(4.59)
AGEi,t 0.932***
(5.44)
0.876***
(5.13)
0.799***
(4.49)
0.834***
(4.67)
0.791***
(4.41)
0.858***
(4.89)
0.917***
(5.38)
0.917***
(5.38)
ROEi,t 0.710
***
(3.00)
0.581**
(2.35)
0.180
(0.62)
0.173
(0.61)
0.769
(1.18)
0.462
(1.12)
0.561**
(2.54)
0.555**
(2.52)
GROWTHi,t 0.071**
(2.19)
0.067**
(1.98)
0.052
(1.31)
0.053
(1.34)
0.066
(1.41)
0.082*
(1.83)
0.076**
(2.28)
0.076**
(2.28)
SOEi,t 0.535
***
(3.17)
0.514***
(3.03)
0.533***
(2.95)
0.541***
(2.99)
0.591***
(3.01)
0.492***
(2.74)
0.532***
(3.14)
0.533***
(3.15)
BIGi,t 0.810**
(2.05)
0.762**
(1.98)
0.926**
(2.31)
1.017**
(2.48)
0.891**
(2.17)
0.908**
(2.24)
0.813**
(2.05)
0.809**
(2.04)
MEETINGi,t 0.041
**
(2.44)
0.039**
(2.35)
0.033*
(1.82)
0.036**
(1.97)
0.040**
(2.11)
0.035*
(1.91)
0.039**
(2.34)
0.039**
(2.34)
BOARDi,t 0.031
(0.79)
0.034
(0.84)
0.033
(0.78)
0.033
(0.76)
0.005
(0.12)
0.022
(0.52)
0.031
(0.77)
0.031
(0.78)
FBi,t 0.662
(1.12)
0.571
(0.95)
0.177
(0.28)
0.193
(0.31)
0.068
(0.10)
0.137
(0.21)
0.646
(1.10)
0.643
(1.09)
Constant 4.026***
(3.97)
3.092***
(3.02)
1.634
(1.38)
3.196***
(2.92)
3.717***
(3.26)
3.301***
(2.98)
3.575***
(3.46)
3.568***
(3.46)
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2939 2939 2114 2114 1710 2082 2939 2939
Pseudo-R2 0.092 0.103 0.072 0.075 0.058 0.063 0.096 0.096
Wald v2 164.07 161.85 114.09 117.76 84.73 97.40 174.76 175.26
p-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6
Sub-sample regressions based on high/low information asymmetry groups.
Independent
variables
VA
(1)
ANADUMi,t
(2)
ANAi,t
(3)
ANA_ADi,t
(4)
FORSDi,t
(5)
FORERRi,t
(6)
INSHDi,t
(7)
ACINSHDi,t
Information
asymmetry
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High
INDEPi,t 1.422
(1.30)
0.038
(0.01)
5.336***
(2.62)
1.200
(0.57)
5.637***
(2.71)
0.790
(0.39)
6.583***
(3.16)
4.456
(1.57)
3.170*
(1.70)
2.498
(1.00)
2.794*
(1.73)
0.512
(0.22)
2.904*
(1.81)
0.258
(0.11)
SIZEi,t 0.321
***
(5.23)
0.349*
(1.66)
0.130
(1.13)
0.236
(1.50)
0.220**
(2.16)
0.311**
(2.20)
0.330**
(2.41)
0.558***
(4.03)
0.378***
(2.99)
0.229*
(1.94)
0.133
(1.40)
0.302*
(1.90)
0.116
(1.22)
0.411***
(2.60)
AGEi,t 0.880***
(6.51)
0.830*
(1.87)
0.727***
(3.34)
1.476***
(4.36)
0.711***
(3.15)
1.147***
(3.44)
0.554**
(2.13)
1.318***
(4.13)
0.909***
(3.51)
0.692**
(2.42)
0.923***
(4.43)
1.766***
(5.66)
0.865***
(4.16)
1.747***
(5.71)
ROEi,t 0.498
(1.56)
0.756
(1.37)
0.966
(1.01)
0.074
(0.18)
0.536
(0.84)
0.396
(0.67)
1.254
(1.12)
1.330
(1.40)
2.227*
(1.65)
0.464
(1.17)
0.810
(1.07)
0.249
(0.69)
0.543
(0.71)
0.297
(0.83)
GROWTHi,t 0.061*
(1.68)
0.080
(1.10)
0.044
(0.37)
0.085
(1.32)
0.032
(0.22)
0.075
(1.42)
0.049
(0.48)
0.066
(1.00)
0.105
(1.34)
0.169**
(2.07)
0.053
(1.08)
0.083
(1.26)
0.054
(1.11)
0.088
(1.23)
SOEi,t 0.492
***
(3.60)
0.591
(1.63)
0.821***
(3.11)
0.605**
(2.28)
0.790***
(3.16)
1.021***
(3.39)
1.062***
(3.34)
0.177
(0.60)
0.589**
(2.16)
0.550**
(2.14)
0.514**
(2.46)
0.832***
(3.04)
0.529**
(2.53)
0.774***
(2.84)
BIGi,t 0.902***
(3.07)
0.714
(0.86)
0.959**
(2.42)
–
(–)
0.633
(1.43)
0.595
(1.09)
2.131***
(2.61)
0.769
(1.35)
1.759***
(2.74)
0.362
(0.64)
0.799**
(2.20)
0.121
(0.15)
0.679*
(1.87)
0.219
(0.27)
MEETINGi,t 0.033
**
(2.18)
0.078*
(1.74)
0.034
(1.28)
0.003
(0.09)
0.051*
(1.94)
0.026
(0.87)
0.023
(0.65)
0.031
(1.05)
0.034
(1.13)
0.030
(0.96)
0.041*
(1.91)
0.046
(1.24)
0.039*
(1.79)
0.028
(0.76)
BOARDi,t 0.023
(0.74)
0.071
(0.75)
0.081
(1.57)
0.040
(0.60)
0.057
(1.05)
0.042
(0.70)
0.036
(0.58)
0.065
(0.93)
0.008
(0.14)
0.008
(0.12)
0.033
(0.69)
0.149**
(2.06)
0.037
(0.79)
0.180**
(2.51)
FBi,t 0.217
(0.47)
2.694**
(2.20)
0.460
(0.57)
0.259
(0.29)
0.694
(0.86)
0.320
(0.34)
0.062
(0.06)
1.610
(1.51)
0.771
(0.92)
0.722
(0.78)
0.549
(0.82)
2.768***
(2.99)
0.542
(0.81)
2.662***
(2.92)
Constant 3.295***
(4.02)
2.995
(1.16)
3.187*
(1.90)
0.797
(0.46)
4.963***
(3.04)
4.218**
(2.33)
7.942***
(4.32)
1.179
(0.60)
5.310***
(3.48)
1.579
(0.98)
2.321*
(1.77)
0.037
(0.02)
2.473*
(1.87)
0.680
(0.38)
Year ﬁxed
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed
eﬀects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2114 772 592 702 600 655 517 497 608 643 834 1045 836 1084
Pseudo-R2 0.061 0.102 0.078 0.087 0.093 0.105 0.102 0.154 0.101 0.088 0.056 0.154 0.053 0.150
Wald v2 133.81 36.25 68.37 66.13 68.37 66.13 56.61 82.30 65.81 54.83 55.00 99.42 51.71 99.60
p-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level, respectively.
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156 Y. Sun et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 145–161columns 2, 3, 4, 7 and 8 are positive and the remaining two are negative. These results are consistent with
Hypothesis 1.
Examining the control variables, ﬁrms with larger size, better performance and shorter listing periods are
more likely to disclose ARIC. SOEs are more likely to disclose ARIC because of high regulation pressure.
These results are consistent with the univariate tests. For auditor size, hiring a Big 4 audit ﬁrm can be con-
sidered as a signal to reduce agency problems. Therefore, as a substitution eﬀect, the Big 4 dummy variable
is negatively related to the voluntary disclosure of ARIC. For internal governance, when directors are more
diligent, the company is more likely to disclose ARIC.
In summary, the regressions in Table 5 show that board independence inﬂuences voluntary ARIC disclo-
sure behavior and this eﬀect is conditional on lower inside information asymmetry. Only when independent
directors’ information acquisition costs are low can their governance roles successfully drive their ﬁrms to vol-
untarily disclose ARIC.5. Robustness tests and additional analysis
5.1. Sub-sample regressions based on information environment
The proxy variables for information environment listed in Table 4 reveal signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
disclosure and no disclosure groups. The information environment is better in the disclosure group, which is
consistent with the literature on the information environment’s eﬀect on information disclosure (Lang and
Lundholm, 1996; Healy and Palepu, 2001). This means that our results oﬀer an alternative explanation, spe-
ciﬁcally that the external information environment has a direct eﬀect on disclosure decisions, as opposed to an
indirect eﬀect through independent directors. In the main tests, we use interaction terms to prove our argu-
ments. However, it is unclear whether ﬁrms with diﬀerent external information environments exhibit system-
atic diﬀerences in ﬁrm characteristics. To rule out this possibility, we partition the sample according to the
degree of information asymmetry. For the dummy variable of analyst following, we just partition the data into
1/0 groups. For other continuous information asymmetry proxies, we divide the sample into high/low groups,
respectively based on the top 30% and bottom 30% of observations.4 For each pair of high/low groups, we re-
run the regression of Eq. (1) without the interaction term and test the eﬀect of the proportion of independent
directors on ARIC, respectively, and then compare the coeﬃcients. The results are shown in Table 6.
As Table 6 illustrates, except for the analyst following proxy, the coeﬃcients on INDEP are signiﬁcantly
positive for all of the other proxy variables of information asymmetry in the low groups, which indicates that
the higher the proportion of independent directors, the higher the likelihood that a ﬁrm will voluntarily dis-
close ARIC. However, in the high groups, the results are not signiﬁcant and the signs are not consistent with
our predictions. In addition, we ﬁnd that both the signiﬁcance level and the absolute value of the coeﬃcients
are larger in the low groups compared to the high groups. The results in Table 6 further prove our hypothesis.5.2. The endogeneity problem
Many studies ﬁnd that the proportion of independent directors is determined by the corporate governance
structure and the nature or characteristics of the ﬁrm (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988; Ye et al., 2007; Duchin
et al., 2010). Since these factors might also aﬀect ﬁrms’ voluntary disclosure behavior, our conclusion may
have an endogeneity problem.
We run a two-stage regression to alleviate this concern. We choose the proportion of independent directors
3 years ago, LagINDEP, as the instrumental variable because independent directors are usually appointed for
a term of 3 years and while the previous term’s directors cannot impact recent ﬁrm decisions, the previous
term’s board structure can aﬀect that of the present term, which makes LagINDEP an eﬀective instrument
variable. Speciﬁcally, in the ﬁrst step we use LagINDEP, the interaction terms of LagINDEP and the4 Alternatively, we take the top (bottom) 40% or 20% of observations and the results are consistent.
Y. Sun et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 145–161 157information environment proxies as the instrumental variables for INDEP, the interaction terms of INDEP
and the information environment proxies, respectively. The results are shown in Table 7.
For brevity, we choose ANA, FORERR and INSHD as the proxies of information asymmetry and only
report the results of the main test variables. Table 7 reveals that in the ﬁrst stage the coeﬃcients of the instru-
mental variables are signiﬁcant, which indicates their eﬀectiveness. In the second regression, we ﬁnd results
that are consistent with Table 5. Thus, our results are robust after adjusting for the endogeneity problem.
5.3. Other robustness tests
For listed ﬁrms in China, since 2001 the proportion of independent directors on the board is expected to be
at least 1/3. Unlike in countries such as the United States, the proportion of independent directors on the
boards of Chinese listed ﬁrms is subject to a threshold. If we want to use an independent director proportion
index to proxy for board independence, as US studies have done, we must consider an increment beyond 1/3.
Thus, we replicate our regression using only those observations with more than 1/3 of independent directors
on the board.5 The results (untabulated) do not change signiﬁcantly.
Our sample period includes important events such as the ﬁnancial crisis and the Chinese government’s four-
trillion-dollar economic stimulus. Given the overall deterioration of the external economic situation and
opportunities for national investment and credit support, listed ﬁrms might also have taken the initiative to
increase the voluntary disclosure of ARIC. To rule out any inﬂuence that these events may have, we re-run
the regression of Eq. (1) for the 2007–2008 period and obtain consistent results (untabulated).
5.4. Additional analysis
We further anticipate that the eﬀect of board independence on voluntary disclosure behavior varies
among ﬁrms with diﬀerent features and we should ﬁnd more pronounced interaction eﬀects when the ben-
eﬁts of auditing internal control systems is larger or in ﬁrms that are more likely to have an ineﬃcient inter-
nal control system. We partition the sample based on listing age and market-to-book ratios. On the one
hand, young ﬁrms are more likely to face ﬁnancing constraints and increasing information disclosure helps
reduce ﬁnancing costs. The market-to-book ratio measures growth rates, with a higher market-to-book ratio
indicating a higher demand for ﬁnancing. On the other hand, both young and high-growth ﬁrms are exposed
to more potential internal control weaknesses (Doyle et al., 2007) and auditing internal controls not only
sends a signal to the market that reduces information asymmetry, but also reﬂects the eﬀectiveness of a
ﬁrm’s monitoring mechanisms. Thus, we predict that the monitoring role of independent directors will be
more pronounced in such ﬁrms. The results of our sub-sample regressions are displayed in Table 8. For list-
ing age and market-to-book ratios, we divide the sample observations into two groups, respectively based on
the top 30% and bottom 30% of observations.6 We re-run the regressions of Eq. (1) for each group. For
brevity, we only use ANA, FORERR and INSHD as the information asymmetry proxy variables and only
report the main test variables. Most of the results in Table 8 reveal that, relative to low growth or high list-
ing age, in the high-growth or low listing age groups the coeﬃcients of the interactions between the infor-
mation asymmetry proxies and the proportion of independent directors are larger and more signiﬁcant,
which is consistent with our predictions. However, the regressions with the FORERR index do not produce
signiﬁcant results.
6. Conclusion
Using a sample of listed ﬁrms that voluntarily disclose ARIC from 2007 to 2009, this study investigates
whether and how board independence as an important governance mechanism drives ﬁrms to voluntarily
audit their internal control systems and disclose ARIC under the theoretical analysis structure of information5 We use the real “more than 1/3 proportion” sample, which refers to when the number of independent directors, minus 1, is still larger
than 1/3 of the board members.
6 We also try the top (bottom) 40% or 20% of observations and the results are similar.
Table 7
Endogeneity tests for the proportion of independent directors.
First stage (1) (2) (3)
INDEPi,t ANAi,t  INDEPi,t INDEPi,t FORERRi,t  INDEPi,t INDEPi,t INSHDi,t  INDEPi,t
LagINDEPi,t 0.329
***
(12.74)
1.246***
(21.99)
0.325***
(13.01)
0.018***
(11.28)
0.281***
(15.25)
5.544***
(13.92)
ANAi,t  LagINDEPi,t 0.004
(1.09)
1.014***
(118.46)
FORERRi,t  LagINDEPi,t 0.015
(0.26)
1.046***
(292.46)
INSHDi,t  LagINDEPi,t 0.000*
(1.82)
1.014***
(273.14)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Observations 2086 2086 2054 2054 2905 2905
Adjusted-R2 0.128 0.921 0.128 0.980 0.148 0.971
F-value 13.786 1018.518 13.554 4129.525 21.975 4110.974
p-Value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Second stage (1) (2) (3)
VA VA VA
INDEPi,t 4.617*
(1.89)
2.592
(1.07)
4.815**
(2.04)
ANAi,t  INDEPi,t 0.586***
(4.91)
FORERRi,t  INDEPi,t 3.631*
(1.83)
INSHDi,t  INDEPi,t 0.014***
(2.62)
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Observations 2086 2054 2905
Wald test of 4.28 3.66 5.74
Prob > v2 (0.118) (0.161) (0.057)
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level, respectively.
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Table 8
Additional analysis.
Independent variables VA
(1) AGEi,t (2) MBi,t
High Low Low High
INDEPi,t 4.094
(1.29)
3.853
(1.21)
3.454
(1.23)
2.772
(1.36)
4.967***
(2.65)
4.446**
(2.45)
4.885**
(2.14)
2.779
(1.30)
3.725*
(1.78)
1.258
(0.51)
4.635**
(2.19)
4.529**
(2.25)
ANAi,t  INDEPi,t 0.312
(0.42)
0.881***
(2.84)
1.089***
(2.84)
1.527***
(3.39)
FORERRi,t  INDEPi,t 12.395
(0.99)
8.928
(1.40)
5.527
(1.07)
8.377
(0.79)
INSHDi,t  INDEPi,t 0.005
(0.16)
0.036***
(2.70)
0.027
(1.06)
0.044***
(2.76)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Year ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry ﬁxed eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 353 344 527 829 818 1019 644 635 893 561 553 857
Pseudo-R2 0.117 0.111 0.111 0.079 0.075 0.095 0.121 0.110 0.150 0.099 0.080 0.123
LR v2 27.77 25.57 34.00 73.96 69.76 101.54 85.14 76.69 126.05 53.82 42.81 83.95
p-Value (0.088) (0.143) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000)
* Signiﬁcance at 10% level.
** Signiﬁcance at 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at 1% level, respectively.
Y. Sun et al. / China Journal of Accounting Research 5 (2012) 145–161 159asymmetry and agency problems. Unlike previous studies, we highlight that only when ﬁrms have better infor-
mation environments and the information asymmetry between insiders and independent directors is relatively
low can independent directors eﬀectively ﬁll their governance roles, which increases the likelihood that ﬁrms
will voluntarily audit their internal control systems. Our results are consistent after adjusting for the inﬂuence
of the endogeneity problem, Chinese independent directors’ regulation factors and the ﬁnancial crisis. Further,
we also ﬁnd some evidence in sub-samples with shorter listing periods and higher growth rates that the mon-
itoring roles played by independent directors to encourage voluntary disclosure decisions are more
pronounced.
Our results highlight how the information acquisition costs of independent directors aﬀects their monitor-
ing eﬀectiveness by giving them the opportunity to investigate the disclosure decisions of internal control
audits, which partially explains the prior mixed results on the monitoring role of independent directors. Fur-
thermore, our results have policy implications that improve the eﬀectiveness of independent directors. How-
ever, we focus exclusively on ARIC-related disclosure decisions to test the monitoring role of independent
directors. Whether or not our results can be generalized to include all voluntary disclosure decisions will
require further testing. Moreover, we use external information environment variables to proxy for the infor-
mation asymmetry between insiders and outside directors. While we have provided explanations for the use of
these variables, further studies are needed to ﬁnd more appropriate proxies for testing and verifying our
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